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1. Introduction 
The limitations of the Developmental State Paradigm were discussed in the introductory 
chapter to this volume. This chapter offers an alternative approach to the DSP through use of 
the notion of systems of (capital) accumulation and its specific application to South Africa’s 
evolving political economy, which we characterise as the ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ (MEC) 
following Fine and Rustomjee (1996).
1
 In this, we reveal what a systems of accumulation 
approach can achieve relative to what the DSP cannot. The argument is focussed on South 
Africa but relates also to more general theoretical questions about the relationship between 
the general tendencies of capitalist development, how to specify capitalist formations, the role 
of ‘middle-range theory’, and how to account for ongoing differentiation within global 
capitalism. We seek to marry abstract laws and tendencies of capitalist development with the 
analysis of specific class relations, social formations, and their many concrete determinations. 
Whilst capital has powerful tendencies which universalise features of development, these 
never settle nor are they reproduced in exactly the same way in concrete social formations. 
Analysis needs therefore to trace the particular historical development and articulation of 
capitalist relations. In particular, we argue that through an emphasis on class relations and 
dynamics situated in the context of the world economy, it is possible to integrate: 
i. different spatial scales of analysis in a manner which recognises that national capital 
relations are conditioned by global capital relations, but that they also contribute to 
and are constitutive of the global whole; 
 
ii. economic and political analysis (including the state) through emphasis on evolving 
class relations and conflicts and how these are reflected in patterns of accumulation 
and economic and social reproduction; 
 
iii. the role played by finance and its impact on class formation; 
 
iv. labour into the analysis through foregrounding understanding of capital as a social 
relation. 
 
In South Africa itself, the term MEC has gained some currency, and has been employed (and 
extended) in a number of recent analyses (eg Bond and Ndlovu 2010; Hallowes 2010; Marais 
2011; Mbeki 2009). And the term has even been referred to casually by members of the 
South African Chamber of Mines – though on the assumption that the domination of the 
economy by mining and energy is a good thing. Rigorous understanding of the MEC needs it 
to be tied firmly both to its ‘parent’ notion of a system of accumulation and to a broader 
theoretical understanding of the abstract tendencies and dynamics of capitalism on a world 
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scale. The separation of different dimensions of analysis is a general limitation of 
institutionalist economics, especially given its predilection for ‘methodological nationalism’, 
and its insistence upon the importance of institutions without adequately tying them to an 
underlying political economy of capitalism. Emphasis on institutions, or on corresponding 
middle-range theory more generally, is also a limitation of some Marxist political economy 
such as the Regulation School or Social Structures of Accumulation approach. To develop 
concrete historical analyses, Marxist political economy best proceeds by linking together the 
abstract and the concrete in a unified framework or dialectic of mediations. 
In many respects, this is exactly the opposite what has been attempted by the immediately 
mentioned approaches when they have been applied to South Africa. For the Regulation 
school, as with Gelb (ed) (1991), the notion of Fordism was hi-jacked and forcibly married 
with apartheid to offer the notion of racist Fordism. Thus, one indisputable empirical 
characteristic, institution even, was analytically imposed upon Fordism, irrespective of its 
theoretical and empirical merits otherwise.
2
 It soon gave birth to its flec-spec, post-Fordist 
version, ISP (1995), an even more blatantly superimposed and alien analytical construct on 
South African realities, Fine (1995).  
Otherwise, Heintz (2002, 2010) has sought to incorporate South Africa into the Social 
Structures of Accumulation approach. In its construction, this is more attuned to South 
African realities than the Regulation approaches, but draws more or less arbitrarily and 
judiciously upon empirically observed characteristics of the South African formation to frame 
the structures of accumulation. But why is one characteristic chosen rather than another and 
how to identify the causal factors that underpin these characteristics and their interaction, 
especially when accumulation is punctured by crises of the social structures (such as the 
demise of apartheid)? 
In short, such approaches suffer from some combination of imposing “foreign” frameworks 
on South Africa and deploying more or less casual empirical observation as a theoretical 
factor that inevitably is found to be both justified on its terrain of application and suspended 
from deeper, systemic explanation. But is the MEC (as the South African system of 
accumulation) open to the same criticism of being middle-range and/or empiricist. 
Significantly, the MEC was first proposed in the context of specific rejection of the DSP 
(although lessons were drawn from the South Korean experience), Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996). This was because of judgement that the state-market dichotomy as analytical prime-
mover is particularly inapplicable to South Africa where class relations and interests have 
been formed through both the state and market according to the interests acting upon and 
through them. And, unlike JK Galbraith’s military-industrial complex, with which it shares at 
most a partial nomenclature, the MEC is not formed simply out of coincidence of given 
interests. Rather, the MEC is the historically derived dynamic of capitalist accumulation 
peculiar to South Africa’s political economy.  
Our discussion of South Africa, therefore, relies, however implicitly, on a more general 
theoretical argument as well as providing close analysis of an important case study, the most 
industrialised society in Africa, where discussion of the notion of the Developmental State, 
DS, has most recently been particularly intense (see Ashman, Fine and Newman 2010a; 
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Edigheji 2010).
3
 We have argued previously that, despite the self-pronounced desire to 
become a DS, South Africa is particularly unlike one as understood in the literature on East 
Asia and more broadly, where high rates of growth were the product of high levels of 
investment in strategic industries, creating a pattern of production and investment, which 
would not have arisen without state intervention and, famously, ‘getting prices wrong’ in 
pursuit of domestic industrialisation (Amsden 1989). South Africa instead has, since the 
defeat of apartheid in 1994, been in key respects the antithesis of a DS. The Government 
explicitly adopted a neoliberal macroeconomic framework from 1996 onwards with the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme. Despite its name, GEAR was 
neither employment-centred nor redistributive. The results of the deregulation of financial 
markets, tariff reduction and trade liberalisation have been capital flight and 
deindustrialisation combined with (sectoral) corporate concentration and the relative absence 
of strategic industrial policy.
4
 
As a consequence, South Africa’s pattern of economic and industrial development remains 
heavily skewed towards the industries around which racial segregation and apartheid grew, 
highly dependent on world commodity prices and vulnerable to currency crises when 
commodity prices collapse, and lacking in secondary industrialisation and employment, while 
financialisation and capital export have contributed to widening inequality, jobless growth 
and lack of investment. Indeed calls for South Africa to become a DS gained momentum in 
response to growing anger and frustration with the lack of post-apartheid change and 
achievement, and the ANC announced its intention of becoming a DS in a discussion 
document (ANC 2005) which, despite having implemented them itself, criticises Washington 
Consensus policies for failing to bring about economic development. The notion of a DS has, 
then, become politically contested, uniquely so and beyond the realms of academia, in terms 
of disputing its substantive content: for some, it is a platform around which to mobilise for 
greater state intervention and reform in the interests of the majority; but for others it is the 
ideological form taken by neoliberal business as usual. This is indicative of a tension within 
the South African state between the discursive shift in using the DS to create a ‘New Growth 
Path’5 and the substantial continuities which remain in policies and outcomes that have 
prompted that shift. 
This chapter, then, makes some arguments about South Africa but is also theoretically self-
aware. For, a critical question for Marxist political economy is how to move from abstract 
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categories of value and capital to an understanding of concrete forms of class society in time 
and space – ascending from the simple or the abstract to the complex and combined – the 
concrete being the unity of many determinations, a movement which also goes from the 
concrete to the abstract in a two way process (Marx 1857; Ilyenkov 1982). How do we 
integrate theory, history and empirical analysis without collapsing into empiricism? How do 
we move from capital to capitalism and then to understanding the differences which exist 
within capitalism? How do we operationalise Marxist theory in a historical and dynamic 
context, uniting abstract tendencies and concepts to the empirical analysis of the concrete 
within a unified framework. This requires the close examination of the specific way that 
capitalist value relations – including the state form that expresses and mediates class relations 
- are constructed, organised, reproduced and also influenced by class struggle itself. And, 
whilst capital relations are conditioned by global capital relations, they also contribute to, and 
are constitutive of, the global whole. 
These are questions beyond our scope here, but we suggest that the notion of a system of 
accumulation, conceived in a particular way, can be extremely helpful in moving from 
abstract concepts to diverse concrete realities. But such ‘middle-range’ concepts, whilst 
necessary and revealing to a greater or lesser degree however they are composed, are not a 
substitute for general, systemic theory, which remains at best implicit and at worst fudged if 
confined to Merton’s (1968)exposition of middle-range theory. Accordingly, a system of 
accumulation (not necessarily a national entity) can be seen in broad or narrow terms. 
Narrowly, it can, for example, be specified as a core set of industrial sectors, with strong 
linkages with one another and relatively weaker linkages with other sectors as demonstrated 
through input-output tables. This is important empirically, as we shall see, though it is 
compatible with a technicist conceptualization that we reject. For such core sectors need to be 
located in relation to the state, finance, class relations and value creation, and how these 
impact across society as a whole. As will be discussed in greater depth, South Africa is 
dominated by a ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ incorporating core sectors, but this dominance 
needs to be understood in conjunction with (not at the expense of) broader considerations 
(Fine and Rustomjee 1991). As a result of the particular articulation of class relations in 
South Africa, manufacturing has been confined to a limited number of industries around 
primary production and remained weak in capital and intermediate goods sectors. Both 
apartheid and post-apartheid economies have failed to diversify out of the core base within 
the MEC, and this structure of production remains critical to understanding South Africa’s 
enduring levels of mass unemployment and its large reserve army of labour (Ceruti 2010). 
We argue that the MEC has changed over time in the light of both domestic and international 
developments which have combined to produce, through the actions of both state and capital, 
the financialisation of the South African economy alongside its continuing concentration on 
core MEC sectors. These interactions – both domestic and global – combine to reproduce the 
specific contemporary form of the MEC as an evolving system of accumulation.  
In this light, we now proceed by specifying the system of accumulation specific to South 
Africa and the distinctiveness of the MEC analysis as developed by Fine and Rustomjee. 
Then, we look at the historical development of the MEC, placing emphasis on the evolution 
of class relations, before looking at the MEC since 1994 under the impact of neoliberalism 
and financialisation. Fourth we look at the shifting DS debate in South Africa, arguing that 
this needs to be situated in terms of the reaction against the neoliberal policies of GEAR. In 
closing remarks, we comment upon how the DSP has dovetailed with recent political and 
policy developments within South Africa.  
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2. An Abbreviated History of the MEC as a System of Accumulation 
So what then is the MEC? It is the specifically South African system of accumulation, that 
has been centred on core sectors around mining and energy, and which has evolved with a 
character and dynamic of its own that has shifted over time. This system of accumulation has 
determined the economic trajectory of South Africa since the discovery of diamonds and gold 
in the second half of the nineteenth century to the present. Since the emergence of capitalist 
relations in mining, South African economic development has been shaped by an array of 
interdependencies between fractions of capital, industrial sectors and the state.  
The conglomerate structure of the South African economy has its origins in mining. Capitalist 
relations were first established on the diamond fields of the Northern Cape. ‘Diggers’ 
Democracy’ initially prevailed in the diamond fields of the Northern Cape, where the 
‘individual small digger was paramount’ and legislation curtailed the number of claims per 
(white) miner (Innes 1984 p. 23). But this was transformed in the space of thirty-five years, 
from 1867, into a monopolistic structure centred on De Beers Consolidated, with a 
corresponding reform of legal and political relationships, governed by the need to minimise 
costs by ensuring large quantities of cheap labour (Innes 1984). The gold fields were first 
proclaimed in 1886, and a process of capital restructuring parallel to that on the diamond 
fields took place, and far more rapidly. Involvement of the diamond magnates in gold mining 
accelerated this process of consolidation, and monopoly institutions such as the joint-stock 
company or mining finance houses and groups reflected the character of British capitalism of 
the time. Labour control was intensified through formal labour stratification established in the 
gold law of 1886, whereby the owners of the means of production were to be exclusively 
white, and ‘non-whites’ were only tolerated on the fields if they were in the service of white 
men (Innes 1984).  
By the time of the formation of the Pact Government in 1924, consolidation across mining 
and industry had taken place with the Anglo American Corporation (under the control of the 
Oppenheimer family) at the centre of economic power. Consolidation in this period 
strengthened monopoly control and brought new areas under the dominance of mining 
capital. But as Innes argues (1984, pp. 111-112), ‘Consolidation was not carried through 
without the eruption of severe economic crises in both branches of the industry; without an 
intensification of open class conflict through the launching of savage onslaughts against 
workers in gold (in 1922) and diamonds (during the depression); and without the 
development of considerable internecine strife and restructuring (especially in diamonds).’ 
Industrial development and diversification up to this point were confined to the development 
of industries to which mining was backwardly linked, most notably explosives for blasting. 
By 1911, the chemicals industry was the largest subsector of manufacturing, with explosives 
making up the largest share.  
With the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, attempts were made by the state to create and support 
its own Afrikaner capital giving rise to a disjuncture between economic power, in the hands 
of ‘English’ mining capital, and the political power deployed by the state.6 The success of 
this was, however, conditioned by the generation of a surplus in mining and the extent to 
which part of this surplus could be deployed in subsidising Afrikaner capital. In reality the 
state was far from monolithic, and industrial development during the interwar period 
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inevitably reflected an uneasy compromise between English mining capital and Afrikaner 
capital, with a mutual interest in generating and sharing the surplus out of mining as well as 
in the exploitation of black (migrant) labour on mines, farms and more generally. In the 
interwar and immediate post-war period, then, core MEC sectors drove the economy, 
furnishing a surplus for the protection and growth of Afrikaner capital.
7
 The establishment of 
state corporations in electricity, steel and transport (to reduce the cost of industrial inputs) 
constituted a major step in this accommodation across the economic power of the mining 
conglomerates and the political power of the Afrikaners, an uneasy compromise of evolving 
fractions of classes and their interests forged through both the state and the market. The 
repressive labour system was a common bond across all capitals and against labour. But this 
acted to strengthen core MEC activity rather than bring about diversification into related 
sectors, leading to a vacuum in intermediate and capital goods and a failure to accrue 
economies of scale and scope other than within core MEC sectors. Whilst Afrikaner capital 
remained weak and small-scale, it could not be promoted on the basis of a broader policy for 
industrialisation but nor could mining capital be deployed for the same purpose without the 
danger of an unacceptable political backlash (and risk of appropriation against state-
supported, diversifying mining conglomerates). The corresponding failure to diversify out of 
the MEC is signalled in part by the absence of coherent state policy both for broad aggregate 
industrial sectors of the economy and for certain subsectors of manufacturing as a 
consequence of the disjuncture between economic and political power (Fine and Rustomjee 
1996). 
Towards the end of the interwar period it was increasingly recognised that, if Afrikaner 
capital was to be able to compete with English capital, it could do so only on the basis of 
larger scale and state support. The Afrikaner Economic Movement was initiated in 1934 and 
was shaped at the first Economiese Volkskongres (People’s Economic Congress) in 1939. It 
was primarily based initially upon Afrikaner populism, small-scale enterprise and farming. 
But a notable accumulation and consolidation of Afrikaner capital did take place in the 
mining sector with  the formation of Anglovaal in the early 1930s, albeit with no direct state 
assistance. In contrast to the European financing utilised in the rest of the mining sector, 
Anglovaal grew through indigenous equity financing. Increasingly, though, small-scale, 
whilst still heavily supported by tariff protection and subsidies, was losing out to larger-scale 
capital in influence. But, despite the increasing significance of larger-scale capital, the weight 
of Afrikaner capital in national economic activity was not rising, and became the target of 
concerted action. 
Accordingly, the National Finance Corporation (NFC) was created in 1949 not long after the 
National Party came into power in 1948. The NFC provided an instrument for the channelling 
of short-term funds into the hands of government bodies. For the first time, there was a major 
institution in the financial sector that allowed for deposits to be invested into treasury bills 
and mining debentures rather than having short-term funds re-deposited in London. This 
development marked a major step in changing the interplay between English capital and the 
state. Rather than relying solely upon private capital, or finance from Britain, Anglo 
American Corporation was able to access NFC financing for the development of the Orange 
Free State Gold Fields. The success of the development of the Gold Fields in turn channelled 
financing to the state which benefitted from  the ‘spread’ between deposits and investment 
through the NFC. This deepened the interdependency between the state and English capital 
and provided the conditions for the further erosion of the disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital, (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). 
                                                          
7
 See also Fine and Rustomjee (1992). 
7 
 
These processes of consolidating Afrikaner capital and integrating it with English capital 
continued into the 1950s with state intervention in industry focused on large-scale 
investments in electricity
8
 and the establishment of Sasol in the fuel and chemicals industry 
through the involvement of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). These sectors 
were both heavily dependent on demand from the mining sector, and their development 
contributed to the growth of the MEC core. The 1950s thus saw the growing presence of 
Afrikaner capital in finance as well as its increasing penetration into core MEC sectors and 
the strengthening of several important groups including Volskas, Sanlam and Rembrant.
9
 
These groups were highly centralised and involved in a number of diverse and overlapping 
activities and, together with Anglovaal and AAC, were able to exert their influence across 
most sectors of the economy.  
The 1960s saw increasing interaction between Afrikaner and English capital and the 
consolidation of the conglomerate structure, which accelerated with the Sharpeville massacre 
and the consequent withdrawal of foreign capital and ownership by domestic conglomerates 
in their place. This trend continued into the 1970s with the increased penetration between 
English and Afrikaner capital and between different factions of Afrikaner capital. By the 
1980s, the ‘six axes’ of private capital which had come to dominate all sectors of the 
economy, including finance, increased in strength and cohesion through extensive 
concentration across  most of the productive sectors. These six conglomerates - Anglo 
American Corporation, Sanlam, SA Mutual, Rembrant, Anglovaal and Liberty Life - 
controlled 84.30% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1985 (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). 
The disjuncture between English and Afrikaner capital had eroded sufficiently to allow 
coordinated industrial policies to be effective and for diversification out of MEC core 
activities to be possible. But, with the collapse of the post-war boom and the Bretton Woods 
system based on gold at $35 per ounce, and the sharp rise in oil and energy prices, a huge 
premium attached to expansion of production of both gold and energy. As a result, an 
industrial strategy for diversification was scarcely considered let alone adopted. Instead, the 
1970s witnessed an extraordinary state-led expansion of gold and energy production 
including huge growth in Eskom power generation and the construction of the Sasol II and III 
plants to convert coal to oil (as a defence against sanctions). In addition to coal mining, 
electricity and chemicals, the 1970s also saw the expansion of several other manufacturing 
industries within the MEC core, including aluminium, titanium and platinum smelting. 
During this period, the apartheid state more resembled a DS than at any time in South 
Africa’s history, with its expanded role in large-scale investment in targeted sectors and 
coordination of its operations with private capital (Freund 2011).  
Into the 1980s, the burgeoning crisis of apartheid also precluded a state and/or private 
strategy for industrial promotion. But, whilst the core MEC industries remained central to the 
economy, capital controls and economic sanctions meant that profits generated internally that 
were not illegally transferred abroad, were confined to accumulation within the South African 
economy. This gave rise both to further conglomeration across the economy and to the 
expansion of a huge and sophisticated financial system. Paradoxically, the development of 
the financial sector saw reductions on the share of investment in long-term physical assets 
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(particularly in the non-MEC sectors) as financial conglomerates reoriented themselves 
towards short-term and speculative investments, reflecting broader shifts in finance and 
banking at the global level as well as a shift towards monetarism as economic orthodoxy. 
MEC conglomerates representing both English and Afrikaner capital shifted increasingly 
towards outward orientation from the 1970s exemplified by high levels of illegal capital 
flight between 1980 and the debt memorandum of 1985 which saw a strengthening of capital 
controls (Mohamed and Finnof 2005). Towards the end of the 1980s, with the anticipation of 
political transition, physical investment by the private sector at this time was focussed on 
high capital-intensity projects that were dependent on export marketing as a strategy to keep 
their assets out of reach of the post-apartheid state to as great an extent as possible (Fine and 
Rustomjee 1996). 
3. The Continuing Centrality of the MEC 
At the sectoral level, the MEC provides an analytical description of historical industrial 
development in South Africa as skewed in favour of mining and related industries and the 
failure of the emergence of a diversified industrial base. Industrial development in South 
Africa has been centred on a core set of industrial sectors organized around mining and 
related activities, which exhibit very strong input-output linkages between them, and 
relatively weaker linkages with other sectors.
10
 Table 1 shows the identification of the MEC 
core sectors based on input-output tables published by Quantec for 2010. The core-MEC 
sectors remain the same as those identified by Fine and Rustomjee (1996) based on input-
output figures for 1988. 64.4% of productive inputs into the MEC sectors come from the 
MEC core itself and 53.0% of output from MEC sectors goes back into the MEC core as 
inputs. The weakness of linkages between the MEC core and non-MEC manufacturing - non-
MEC manufacturing sectors draws 23% of its inputs from the MEC core and provides just 
6% of inputs into the MEC sectors as a whole - in part explaining the extent to which the 
development of the MEC sectors has occurred at the expense of other manufacturing 
activities. 
 
Table 1. The Interdependence of the MEC input/output linkages 2010 
MEC subsector Share of 
inputs from 
MEC sectors 
(% of total) 
Share of 
output to MEC 
sectors (% of 
total)  
Coal mining 26 90 
Gold and uranium ore mining 55 5 
Other mining
* 
23 77 
Coke and refined petroleum products 88 18 
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Basic chemicals 77 60 
Other chemicals and man-made fibres 67 37 
Plastic products 68 30 
Non-metallic minerals 73 8 
Basic iron and steel 82 59 
Basic non-ferrous metals 91 59 
Metal products excluding machinery 70 41 
Machinery and equipment 63 53 
Electricity gas and steam 53 47 
Non-MEC manufacturing 23 6 
* 
The category other mining includes: extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities 
incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying; mining of iron ore; mining of non-ferrous metal ores, 
except gold and uranium; stone quarrying, clay and sand-pits, mining of diamonds (including alluvial 
diamonds), mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals; extraction and evaporation of salt; mining of precious 
and semi-precious stones, except diamonds; asbestos; other minerals and materials nec; service activities 
incidental to mining of minerals. 
Data source: Input-output tables, Quantec 2011 
This descriptive identification of the MEC reveals the historical importance of the MEC core 
sectors as a site of accumulation within the South African economy in and of itself. In 1924 
the relative contribution of the MEC sectors to GDP stood at around 20%. With a share of 
16% of GDP, mining made up the bulk of activities at this time. Between 1924 and 1960 the 
contribution to GDP of the MEC core fluctuated between 17% and 26%, albeit with a decline 
in the share of GDP from mining from over 20% in 1933 to just 7% in 1971. The MEC’s 
contribution to GDP fell in the 1960s from 22% to about 17 % but rose to a high of 32% in 
1980.
11
 Between 1994 and 2010, the share of MEC sector output to GDP continues to be 
significant, fluctuating between 21% and 23% even if shifting in composition
12
 (figure 2). 
MEC sectors continue to be an important earner of foreign exchange making up just below 
60% of total exports. Moreover, mining has increased its share of total exports since 2007, 
largely because of the rise in gold prices following the onset of the global financial crisis 
(figure 3).  By contrast, non-MEC manufacturing was stagnant between 1960 and 1990, 
fluctuating within a narrow band of 15-17% of GDP (Fine and Rustomjee 1996, p81). Non-
MEC manufacturing has declined since the 1990s from 22% in 1990 to under 15% in 2010 
(Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. GDP contribution of the MEC 1970-2010 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP contribution of MEC sectors 
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Figure 3. MEC exports as a percentage of total export value 
 
 
A key correlate of the persistence of such a sectoral bias in the industrial composition of 
output in South Africa is the chronic level of structural unemployment. The unemployment 
rate has increased since the end of apartheid, together with inequality, and stood at 25% in the 
first quarter of 2011.
13
 Productive activity within the MEC core tends to be highly capital-
intensive and the weakness of linkages between the MEC core and other productive sectors 
means that its expansion has few multiplier effects across the economy as a whole. Figure 4 
shows the sectoral shares of total employment. Employment within the MEC core has been in 
decline since the late 1980s from 1.4million in 1987 to 1.1 million in 2010 (employment 
numbers within the MEC were at their lowest point since 1994 at just under 0.9 million in 
2001). The share of total employment of the MEC core has fallen below that of non-MEC 
manufacturing, despite the relatively small and declining weight of the latter.    
Over the past decade, the services sector has seen dramatic expansion in terms of its share of 
GDP and employment, and has been regarded as central to solving the unemployment 
problem, at least in the short term (ANC 2006, Tregenna 2008). Much of this expansion has 
taken place in finance and business services, along with wholesale and retail. Employment in 
these sectors has been highly casualised and precarious (Mohamed 2009, Tregenna 2008). In 
addition, much of the employment in retail and wholesale, and other personal services, has 
resulted from debt-driven consumption that came with an expansion of credit in the decade or 
so prior to the global financial crisis and is, thus, highly susceptible to sudden changes in 
economic conditions (Mohamed 2009). 
 
 Figure 4. Sectoral shares of total employment 
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Tables 2 and 3 show the share of fixed capital stock and changes in capital stock across 
economic sectors between 1970 and 2009, respectively. The relative shares of capital stock 
across economic sectors have remained remarkably unchanged since 1970. The 1970s and 
1980s saw enormous physical investment in MEC sectors and, despite, a decline in physical 
investment in the 1990s, the noughties has seen an increase in investment across MEC 
sectors, and especially in mining, while manufacturing sectors in general and non-MEC 
manufacturing in particular have experienced an absolute decline in capital stock (Ashman et. 
al 2010b). 
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Table 2. Fixed capital stock as a percentage of total fixed capital stock in the economy 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 
Mining total 6.11% 6.32% 8.59% 7.90% 8.02% 
MEC sectors total 15.12% 19.91% 23.30% 22.20% 21.26% 
Manufacturing total 8.94% 12.00% 12.10% 13.94% 12.33% 
Non-MEC manufacturing 4.03% 3.56% 3.55% 4.05% 4.10% 
Non-MEC manufacturing (less 
autos) 
3.65% 3.20% 3.13% 3.45% 3.44% 
Tertiary sectors 67.94% 66.20% 65.19% 67.07% 68.45% 
Finance, insurance and business 
services 
22.55% 20.40% 21.89% 22.57% 22.42% 
 
 
Table 3. Change in capital stock (R billions at 2005 prices)  
 
  1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Mining total 43.47 79.549 0.372 60.703 
MEC sectors 177.56 162.34 28.72 127.07 
Manufacturing total 104.86 46.42 76.87 44.87 
Non-MEC manufacturing 17.85 15.17 20.97 30.78 
Non-MEC manufacturing (less autos) 16.56 12.22 16.71 24.48 
Tertiary sectors 494.17 279.63 187.09 527.25 
Finance, insurance and business services 130.95 127.92 65.69 156.69 
 
 
4. The MEC Today 
In short, post-apartheid economic development has been marked by the persistence of the 
MEC as the dominant system of accumulation, although in a different form with the 
evolution of class relations that has taken place with, and since, political transition. The post-
apartheid period has seen the strengthening of the influence of capital over the state and 
policy; a reduction in the concentration of capital among the six large conglomerates through 
capital restructuring driven by the need to update outdated (centralised) corporate and 
managerial structures; increased financialisation and international expansion of the 
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conglomerates; and the shifting structure of capital through , Black Economic Empowerment, 
BEE, deals – the enrichment of those with political and other connections through varieties of 
means but rarely functional to capital accumulation as opposed to surplus appropriation. A 
number of commentators, even if broadly sympathetic to the MEC-approach, have remarked 
upon the decline of the importance of the MEC in modern South Africa (Bond 2005, Chabane 
et al 2006; MacDonald (ed) (2009)) on the grounds of the increasing sectoral share of output 
and employment in the tertiary sector. We argue that such a conclusion is drawn from an 
overly technicist reading of the MEC as limited to the sectoral structure of the economy (i.e. 
the empirical outcome of the MEC in terms of composition of output alone, and possibly 
intersectoral linkages, important though these are) to the exclusion of an understanding of 
evolving class relations and the persistence of the MEC in increasingly globalised and 
financialised forms at times beyond its traditional core. On this reading, then, the MEC has 
survived more or less intact over the post-apartheid period. This is not to say it has remained 
unchanged, quite the opposite, just as it has experienced significant change in the past (as 
with incorporation of Afrikaner capital, growth of financial interests tied to the MEC, and 
growing conglomerate ownership across the economy). In particular, the South African 
economy over the post-apartheid period has been driven by financialisation and globalisation. 
These have dominated both the low pace of domestic accumulation and the form and 
composition taken by the restructuring of the domestic economy. Whilst the MEC core 
sectors have strengthened, the fastest growing sector in the economy over the last twenty 
years has been finance and related services, now taking as much as 20% of GDP, although 
40% of the population benefit from no financial services at all. Domestic levels of investment 
are half those generally acknowledged to be necessary for DS status.  
Financialisation has not only produced credit-based consumption based on speculation in 
housing markets, it has been accompanied by unprecedented levels of capital flight, much of 
it illegal and managed by big corporations through transfer pricing. This illegal capital flight 
was extensive during the apartheid period but it has now attained new heights (Ashman, Fine 
and Newman 2011). Such levels of capital flight place the economy permanently on the cusp 
of instability, with interest rates being held high in order that volatile short-term capital 
inflows can compensate for long-term outflows. The exchange rate has been held at a high 
level with the effect of making capital outflows worth more in foreign currency to those who 
benefit from them, whilst making it ever more difficult to sustain both the exchange rate and 
economic growth. And whilst the orthodox macroeconomic policy of GEAR was supposed to 
attract FDI, growth in FDI inflows between 1996 and 2002 was around 2% per annum and 
this figure would be lower if we removed capital inflows from South African corporations 
that have been relisted abroad (Cronin 2002) and the acquisition by overseas capital of shares 
in two of South Africa’s big four banks. Moreover to the extent that the conglomerate 
structure has been dismantled, it has been only to create sectoral monopolies whose 
profitability depends upon high prices and not productivity increase. Industrial policy has 
been token, with the only major exception being the auto industry. Absent has been any 
commitment to secure long-term finance for investment in labour-intensive domestic 
production to meet domestic consumption of basic needs, thereby creating jobs, alleviating 
unemployment and addressing the inequalities inherited from apartheid.  
 
5. The Shifting Developmental State Debate in South Africa  
The democratic transition in South Africa also saw the transition of the ANC government 
from its ideological roots in the Freedom Charter to the apparent wholehearted embracing of 
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neoliberalism. By 1994, the ANC had abandoned almost all of the socially progressive 
policies that had been developed, notably by the ANC’s Department of Economic Policy 
(DEP) from 1990 and the Macro Economic Research Group (MERG) between 1991 and 
1993 as the ANC prepared to take office in the first democratic election. By the time it did so, 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was the only remaining policy 
programme with progressive policies, juxtaposed with the neoliberal macroeconomic 
framework that was made explicit in the implementation of the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) programme in 1996. The inclusion of the RDP in the ANC’s 1994 
election manifesto was largely driven from below by trade unions and civic organisations, 
‘and adopted only rather more opportunistically by the core group of the ANC senior leaders, 
it emphasized the centrality to the planning process of both the meeting of the populace’s 
basic needs and the active empowerment of that populace in driving its own development 
process’ (Saul 2001, p. 439). The RDP thus appeared as an add-on to the broader 
developmental strategy based on trickle-down and growth through liberalisation. This is in 
stark contrast to the centrality of progressive social and economic policies within the strategy 
of ‘Growth through Redistribution’ that was envisaged in the policy documents of the DEP 
and the MERG.  
The main protagonists in the South African DS debate have been the left within the ANC 
Alliance who have harnessed the concept in their critique of the Government’s adoption of 
neoliberal policies in general, and the Mbeki administration in particular. The concept has 
been particularly important for the South African Communist Party (SACP) for whom it has 
been intellectually central in their understanding of the National Democratic Revolution.
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(SACP 2008) The DS debate started to gain momentum when it became clear that GEAR had 
failed to deliver on almost all aspects of growth and development. In face of widespread 
anger and frustration at the lack of change and achievement since the demise of apartheid, the 
ANC projected itself as offering a prospective DS, casually referencing the US-funded 
Marshall Plan for reconstructing post-war Europe, the experience of the East Asian NICs, and 
the European Union as examples of successful economic development in the twentieth 
century (ANC 2005).  
A flurry of academic interest immediately attached itself to the notion of the South African 
DS following this declaration of intent. Much of the analysis of the DS in SA has been 
couched in terms of institutional capacities (as in the DSP in general) and assessing 
‘developmentalism’ in light of capacity to formulate appropriate policies, mobilise and 
allocate resources in line with identified policy targets, as well as monitoring and evaluating 
policies and their implementation On this basis, the conclusion has been drawn that the South 
African state, while not powerless, is weak in terms of its capacities (Gumede 2008; Pillay 
2007; Southhall 2006; van Dijk and Croucamp 2007). The weakness of state capacity has, 
however, been exaggerated. There are numerous examples where both the state and the 
private sector exhibit high levels of capacity, with the staging of the FIFA World Cup in 2010 
as just one; if only similar effort had gone into housing for the poor as for the building of 
stadia. 
                                                          
14
 Despite its origins in the left of the ANC Alliance, the DS debate has been less promoted 
by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Prior to the mainstreaming of 
the DS debate within the ANC from 2005, COSATU had been relatively silent on the notion. 
While general supportive of a South African DS, COSATU’s understanding of it conforms to 
the ANC’s relatively shallow reading of the experiences of late industrialisation in East Asian 
economies, as effectively pursuing top-down reforms around industrial policy with no 
consideration for the role of labour or broader aspects of development (Pillay 2007). 
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The DS debate marked the battlefield within the increasingly divided ANC between 
supporters of Mbeki and, then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, with many commentators 
speaking of an inevitable split of the ANC. (McGreal 2007, BBC 2008) The South African 
DS became a political project of the Zuma camp in direct opposition to Mbeki as the 
orchestrator of South Africa’s neoliberal policies. The ANC’s internal power struggle came 
to a head in December 2007 at the 52
nd
 ANC Annual Conference in Polokwane, where Mbeki 
suffered a humiliating defeat, with Zuma taking 60% of the vote. In September 2008, Mbeki 
was forced to step down as President before completing his second term in office.  
At the ANC policy conference in June 2007, there was talk of a ‘broad consensus’ over the 
need for a DS with correspondingly more government intervention. It inspired a renewed 
flurry of academic activity around the DS, notably the Sanpad conference in June 2007 and 
the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) ‘Conference on the Developmental State in 
South Africa’ in 2008 – the proceedings of which have, ultimately, been published in 
volumes edited by Maharaj et al (eds) (2010) and Edigheji (2010), respectively.
15
 In this 
respect, as suggested in the opening Chapter, the DS has indeed become a buzzword and 
fuzzword. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
South Africa, then, offers a relatively unusual example of the intersection between academic 
endeavour and immediate political manoeuvring, with the DS serving as both conceptual and 
political football. For the latter, and policy-wise, the 2006 National Industrial Policy 
Framework (NIPF) and subsequent Industrial Policy Action Plans (IPAP) of 2007 and 2010 
have reflected, at least in principle, an increasingly interventionist approach to industrial 
policy, targeted at the generation of decent and sustainable employment. On coming into 
office, President Jacob Zuma undertook a dramatic reshuffling of the Cabinet with 
appointments of prominent figures from the left of the ANC Alliance in key positions relating 
to economic policy. Rob Davies, member of the SACP central committee, was appointed 
Minister of Trade and Industry while prominent trade unionist Ebrahim Patel was appointed 
as Minister for Economic Development, heading up the new Department of Economics 
Development. 
In its purported aim of building a strong institutional structure around economic policy 
making and implementation, the Zuma government has sought a compromise between the 
right and the left in the ANC tri-partite Alliance, incorporating the former through 
appointment of Pravin Gordhan as Minister of Finance alongside his predecessor Trevor 
Manuel as head of the new National Planning Commission housed within the Presidency. The 
transition from Mbeki to Zuma has also seen a change in the discourse coming from the ANC 
from the need for South Africa to become a DS, to the need for South Africa to charter a 
‘New Growth Path’ (NGP) on which there is apparent consensus within the ANC.  
 
This can be seen in terms of a number pronouncements from the new Government. Thus, 
“Now is the time to lay the groundwork for stronger growth going forward, and for growth 
that gives rise to more jobs.” President Jacob Zuma, State of the Nation Address, 11 February 
2010. And, “The negative, unintended consequences of this [old] growth path are manifold 
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 The HSRC project was engendered as a way of providing intellectual legitimacy for the DS 
as a political project. The intellectual content of the conference and subsequent edited volume 
turned out to be highly critical of the concept of the DS in general and the notion of South 
Africa as a DS in particular. 
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they include large and unsustainable imbalances in the economy, continued high levels of 
unemployment and a large current account deficit. These weaknesses have been exacerbated 
by the global recession. Taken together these challenges are enormous and make it critical 
that we upscale our industrial policy efforts.” Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry, 
National Assembly Statement on IPAP2, 18 February 2010. Whilst, “ in growing the wider 
economy, broadening participation, deepening trade and strengthening our revenue base, we 
have recognised that a new growth path is needed, that industrial policy has to be founded on 
a well-considered action plan and that we need to do more to promote a dynamic economy, 
capable of responding both to domestic demand and international opportunities.” Pravin 
Gordhan, Minister of Finance, Budget Vote Speech, 11 May 2010. And, “Faced with these 
realities and the challenges of very high inequality and deep levels of poverty, we are 
working on ways to improve the employment performance of the economy and create many 
more decent work opportunities and better social outcomes. We call this the development of a 
new growth path.” Ebrahim Patel, Minister of Economic Development, on the occasion of the 
debate on Budget Vote 27: Economic Development, in an extended public committee 
meeting of the National Assembly, 23 March 2010. 
 
In this light, rather than simply abandoning the DS agenda as a conduit to, but not of, power, 
the NGP strives to serve as yet another false unifier for consensus, both departing in major 
part from, and yet flexibly reinventing, the DS to suit. For Minister Patel, and those on the 
left, a fully functioning South African DS provides the means by which the NGP is achieved 
(EDD 2010). Yet, despite the apparent commitment to a progressive, redistributive agenda, 
Ministers Patel and Davies face serious obstacles in their ability to pursue this further, not 
least because of the compromises attached to the NGP/DS dualism. And we have sought to 
establish that these compromises derive from the evolving class nature of South Africa as a 
system of accumulation, in which the MEC has played a continuing if shifting role, especially 
through capital-intensive accumulation within the domestic economy currently underpinning 
the globalisation and financialisation of domestic conglomerates (not least through a tolerated 
if illegal capital flight). 
Of course, in the world of scholarship, such complicity is not inevitable. The DS can be 
reinvented once more to be more progressive, and more inclusive both of agencies other than 
industrialists and of economic and social activity other than industry. But, if the DSP is to 
succeed in its goals, in South Africa or otherwise, it will need to be more mindful of how 
class relations and systems of accumulation inform the role of the state and the global market, 
and their determinants, rather than vice-versa. 
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